An East End hotel and its owner have been ordered to pay a total of £45,000 for “serious and systemic” fire safety failures which “put staff and guests at risk”.

Act Grange Ltd, which runs The Baytree Hotel in Vicarage Lane, and the company’s sole director Mr Falgun Patel were sentenced at Southwark Crown Court earlier this month after pleading guilty to five breaches of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. If Mr Patel fails to pay his fine, he could face six months imprisonment.

London Fire Brigade Fire Safety Officers visited the 16-room hotel, which is above a traditional East-End pub, in January 2019 as part of a routine audit. During the visit, they found serious fire safety deficiencies including no smoke detection, numerous fire doors tied open and missing or malfunctioning door closers.

Officers also found a first-floor external emergency exit route was being used to store large amounts of rubbish and was blocked along almost its entire length. It led to a gate which was locked and could not be opened by staff.

There was no fire risk assessment in place or any evidence of methodical management of fire safety and on duty staff could not explain emergency procedures.
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Following the visit, an Enforcement Notice was served on Mr Patel and he was interviewed under caution in relation to the deficiencies. The Brigade then took the prosecution forward to court.

The full (original) article can be found at: https://www.ifsecglobal.com/

A review of 200 fire safety legislation cases handled by fire safety solicitor, Warren Spencer, found that the average fine since the Grenfell is now £27,519. This is more than a 35% higher than the average across 2014-2019, which is £20,375. 

Warren Spencer's research, published to mark the 13th anniversary of the Fire Safety Order coming into force, also found that three fire services have not brought a single prosecution under the order.

The most enforced part of the order relates to emergency routes and exits. The ground-breaking study reveals that the most enforced part of the order is Article 14, which relates to emergency routes and exits. And of Spencer’s 200 cases only nine defendants have pleaded not guilty to all charges brought.

The research might be the most detailed analysis yet of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, to give it its full name.

Camden Council has successfully prosecuted an irresponsible landlord for multiple fire safety risks and overall breaches against the Housing Act 2004.

Camden Council reported that after investigation, it was found that Mr Cesar De Sousa Melo failed to provide adequate fire/smoke alarms in his a flat he had been letting.

The council said: “Tenants’ health and safety at Goldington Crescent was placed at risk through non-working fire alarms, a kitchen door broken off its hinges and the property being overcrowded, and the kitchen was too small.”
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All tenants were identified as young, overseas tenants who were vulnerable to exploitation, that had their health and safety ‘compromised’ through the landlord’s neglect.

This case is the first of its kind in London, where a landlord is banned from letting for numerous safety breaches including fire.

Mr Melo’s operation has now ceased, and all the flats have been fitted with working smoke/fire detectors.

​https://news.camden.gov.uk/camden-council-obtains-londons-first-rogue-landlord-banning-order/

Evacuation

There were no plans to evacuate Grenfell Tower available. Sir Martin Moore-Bick, chair of the Grenfell Inquiry, recommended:

• The development of national guidelines for carrying out partial or total evacuations of high-rise buildings – including protecting fire access routes and procedures for evacuating people who require assistance
• Fire services develop policies for partial or total evacuation of high rises
• Owner and manager be required to draw up and keep under review evacuation plans, with copies provided to local fire and rescue services and placed in an information box on the premises
• All high-rise buildings be equipped with facilities to enable the sending of an evacuation signal to the whole or a selected part of the building
• Owners and managers be required by law to prepare personal evacuation plans for residents who may struggle to do so personally, with information about them stored in the premise’s information box
• All fire services be equipped with smoke hoods to help evacuate residents down smoke-filled stairs

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Fire doors

Sir Martin said it is apparent that “ineffective fire doors allowed smoke and toxic gases to spread through the building more quickly than should have been possible”, and that missing self-closers played an important role. He recommended:

• An urgent inspection of fire doors in all buildings containing separate dwellings, whether or not they are high rises
• A legal requirement on the owner or manager of these buildings to check doors at least every three months to ensure self-closing devices are working effectively

Sprinklers

Noting the recommendation from the coroner investigating the Lakanal House fire that the use of sprinklers be encouraged, Sir Martin said that some of his experts had “urged me to go a step further and to recommend such systems be installed in all existing high-rise buildings”.

He said that sprinklers have “a very effective part to play” in an overall scheme of fire safety, but that he had not yet heard evidence about their use. He said that he could make no recommendations at this stage, but that he would consider the matter in phase two.

Internal signage

Floor numbers in the tower were not clearly marked and markings were not updated when the floor numbers changed following the refurbishment. Sir Martin said that all high-rise buildings should have floors clearly marked in a prominent place, which would be visible in low light or smoky conditions. Given that not all residents of Grenfell could read fire information signs, he said this should now be provided in a means that all residents can understand.

Use of combustible materials

Sir Martin said the original fire in the kitchen was no more than an ordinary kitchen fire that spread to the cladding because of “the proximity of combustible materials to the kitchen windows” – such as the uPVC frames.

He said this is a matter that “it would be sensible” for owners of other high-rise buildings to check.

He said he would “add his voice” to those who have expressed concern about the slow pace of removal work for more than 400 other tall buildings in England with aluminium composite material cladding.

A total of 97 buildings in the social housing sector and 168 in the private sector have not yet seen the work complete. Sir Martin said the work must be completed “as vigorously as possible”.

He said particular attention should be paid to decorative features, given the crucial role played by the architectural crown at Grenfell in spreading the fire around the building.

Given the decision to ban combustible materials on new buildings last year, he did not call for further restrictions on their use.

Fire service: knowledge and understanding of materials in high-rise buildings

Sir Martin raised concern that junior firefighters were not aware of the danger of cladding fires, and that the London Fire Brigade (LFB) was unaware of the combustible materials used to refurbish Grenfell Tower.

He therefore recommended:

• That the owner and manager of every high-rise building is required to provide details of external walls and the materials used to the local fire service, and inform them of any changes
• To ensure that fire services personnel at all levels understand the risk of cladding fires

Plans

Sir Martin said that a lack of plans did not “unduly hamper” fire services at Grenfell, as each floor was laid out in the same way. However he warned that another building with a more complex layout could pose problems. He recommended:

• That owners and managers of high-rise buildings are required by law to provide paper and electronic versions of building plans of all high rises to local fire services
• To ensure the building contains a premises information box, including a copy of floor plans

Lifts

Firefighters were unable to use a mechanism that allows them to take control of the lifts on the night of the fire, hampering their progress and meaning residents could still use the lifts, “in some cases with fatal consequences”. Sir Martin therefore recommended:

• That the owner and manager of every high-rise building be required by law to carry out regular inspections of any lift required for use by firefighters and the mechanism that allows them to take control of it

Section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act

The judge was concerned that inspections of the tower by the fire service before the fire were not enough to meet their responsibilities under this act. He recommended:

• A revision of the guidance for the London Fire Brigade, and training for all officers above the rank of crew manager in inspecting high-rise buildings

Co-operation between emergency services

There was a lack of communication between each emergency service at Grenfell, with each declaring a major incident at different times without telling each other. Sir Martin recommended several changes to ensure better communication in the future.

Personal fire protection

Sir Martin decided not to issue a recommendation that individual flats be provided with fire extinguishers or fire blankets, noting concerns that this could encourage residents to fight fires rather than escape and call the emergency services.

Communication between the control room and the incident commander

While guidance calls for a “free flow” of information between a fire service control room and the commanding officer on the ground, that often does not happen. Sir Martin therefore recommended:

• A review of policies by the LFB on this matter, including training for all officers who could serve as incident commanders and senior control room officers.
• A dedicated communications link between the senior officer and the incident commander

Emergency calls

Even allowing for the pressure of the night, Sir Martin said that fire survival guidance calls were not handled in an “appropriate or effective way”. He therefore recommended:

• Amending of policies and training for control room officers
• That all fire services develop policies for multiple fire survival guidance calls
• Electronic systems to record and display calls
• A policy for managing a transition from ‘stay put’ to ‘get out’ and training for call handlers in delivering this change of advice

Command and control

Sir Martin said firefighters too frequently “acted on their own initiative”, resulting in a duplication of effort. He called for better policies to ensure:

• Better control of training and deployment
• Information is obtained from crews after they have deployed

Equipment

Sir Martin made some recommendations for improvements to fire service equipment, including radios and the command support system.

Testing and certification of materials

Sir Martin said this is an issue that will be investigated “early in phase two”, along with an assessment of “whether the current guidance on how to comply with the building regulations is sufficiently clear and reliable”.
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He also said the inquiry would investigate whether a ‘prescriptive’ regime of regulation was necessary. However, as these issues have not yet been examined by the inquiry he did not make any recommendations.

Source: Inside Housing

When choosing a Fire Risk Assessor, you must insist on seeing their Third Party Certification. Why? Third Party Certification offers independent verification and evidence that your Assessor is competent and working to the appropriate standards and best practice for the specific service you require.

The Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety by Dame Judith Hackitt, following the tragedy of Grenfell Towers, has increased the focus on fire safety responsibilities, particularly around the responsibilities of the person appointed for fire safety within a building* and actions they can take to mitigate fire risk to the best of their ability following national fire safety legislation.

First party referral 

This is simply a self-endorsement. This is when a provider tells you directly that they are good enough to fulfil your requirements with no evidence of their competency.

Second party referral 

This involves someone else, such as another customer, contractor register or trade association (without third party certification criteria for joining) stating that a provider can fulfil their requirements. However, there still may be little or no credible and independent evidence to prove their competency.

UKAS Accredited Third Party Certification 

This takes this to another level completely to ensure provider competence. This is when an independent Certification Body which is accredited by UKAS (the national accreditation body for the UK appointed by Government) sends trained assessors out to assess the provider. They confirm the provider is working to the latest appropriate standards and best practice for the specific service they deliver. They check and verify these required competencies and management systems to ensure that the provider can do what they say - and are checked annually.

A quick Google search for ‘fire risk assessors’ will generate an enormous list of results. Unfortunately, however, standards vary widely.

Speaking in the Expertise & Guidance Theatre at this year's FIREX conference, Howard Passey (a former engineer and site manager in the construction industry), stated that any assessor whose training extends to two hours of e-learning – a “nonsense”, frankly “frightening” – will likely sit at the inferior end of the spectrum.

One of more than 100 training providers in this discipline, the FPA had trained around 1,000 FRAs in the last 12 months, said Passey.

He listed the FRA registers and the number of companies on each (as of that time, Mid June 2019):

• IFE: 241
• IFSM: 55
• FRACS (Warrington Fire) 48 individuals, four companies
• BAFE SP205 – 78 companies

Three tiers of competence

Much of the FRA role’s complexity, said Passey, lies in balancing multiple variables. For instance, they might compensate for ageing fire systems by recommending more staff such as fire wardens.

Hackitt said FRAs must be free do make these judgements – but this was contingent on a high level of competence: “An outcomes-based framework requires people who are part of the system to be competent,” she wrote – “to think for themselves rather than blindly following guidance, and to understand their responsibilities to deliver and maintain safety and integrity throughout the life cycle of a building.”

The aim is to create tiers of competence and assigning appropriately qualified FRAs depending on building type. BAFE has set the template here in terms of developing a certification scheme for assessors.

Three grades are proposed:

• Trainees: for simple premises only
• General practitioner: intermediate complexity
• High-risk: premises like hospitals, care homes, high risk residential

He also recommended that FRAs become an OSHCR (Occupational Safety and Health Consultants Register) consultant, the requirements of which are set out here.

Dutyholders and Higher Risk Residential Buildings (HRRBs)

The ‘responsible person’ – the person ultimately responsible for fire safety in a building – will be replaced by a duty holder. Whereas the identity of the responsible person is often unclear – it could be an individual, a board of directors, or even a corporation – duty holders will be qualified by accredited industry bodies and listed on a public register.

Passey was in doubt about the need for greater transparency here. He recalled numerous occasions where recommendations he’d made in a fire risk assessment had still not been acted on 12 months later.

Speaking at FIREX International 2019, Kizzy Augustin, a partner at Russell Cooke LLP, said: “We’ve seen it a bit in general health and safety, where risk assessors have been prosecuted in a personal capacity for failing to provide adequate advice or adequate risk assessments for the use of a business.

“For the first time in 2014, a risk assessor went to prison for nine months for a breach of health and safety rules. That sent shockwaves through the risk assessor community. Before that a risk assessor had never been prosecuted successfully and facing prison. It’s a real prospect now.”

Ms Augustin said some of the common issues which are being investigated after the Grenfell Tower tragedy including a lack of fire risk assessment, evacuation planning and the use of appropriate material.

A police investigation into the Grenfell Tower fire raised concerns about the quality of fire doors in the UK, after it revealed the doors had failed a test in just 15 minutes – half the required FD30 standard.

The bad news: The government has subsequently carried out tests on a number of  popular models of ‘composite’ plastic fire doors, 75% of which failed to meet the standard criteria. 

The good news: Newly released findings show that 100% of timber doors tested have passed the official government test. Those tested included glazed and un-glazed doors with a variety of different hardware, tested on both sides. However, these results only apply to doors that are purchased directly from the manufacturer and produced to specification.

The government's Housing secretary, James Brokenshire, told parliament:  “It is important to be clear that, although the results of our testing provide assurances for residents who have concerns about their fire doors, it is for building owners to assure themselves that the fire doors they install are fit for purpose and have the required documentation and certification.”

The take-home message is that any 'responsible person' must not rely solely on the results from government testing. What applies to one door, might not apply to the other!